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The Generic Reasons for Strikes 
An Interprétative Analysis of the Israëli Case 
Albert A. Blum 
and 
Gedaliahu H. Harel 
The purpose of this paper is to reveal those universal socio-
economic conditions which generally foster strikes, and the most 
gênerai labor relations-related reasons for conflicts which even-
tually resuit in strikes. 
Because of their debilitating effect on the Israeli economy, strikes are 
increasingly becoming the subject of scientific inquiry on the part of Israeli 
scholars. A number of récent studies suggest various causes of the 
deteriorating labor relations in Israël1. Despite their valuable data and 
useful organization of the facts, we feel that thèse studies are déficient in 
their conclusions. While they ail display an impressive statistical apparatus, 
they fail to uncover those generic causes of strikes in Israël which may be 
discovered through a systematic theoretical discussion. 
It is the purpose of this paper to reveal, in the course of such a discus-
sion, those universal socio-economic conditions which generally foster 
strikes, and the most gênerai labor relations-related reasons for conflicts 
which eventually resuit in strikes. Thèse generic reasons must not be confus-
ed with the immédiate causes of individual strikes - a confusion which tends 
to obscure the basic reasons underlying thèse stoppages. 
• BLUM, Albert A., Prof essor and Dean, Harold Léonard Stuart School of Manage-
ment and Finance, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
•• HAREL, Gedaliahu H., Lecturer, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Manage-
ment, Technion-Israël Institute of Technology. 
1 See Abraham MICHAEL and Refael BAR-EL, Strikes in Israël, 1960-1969; A Quan-
titative Approach, Ramat-Gan, Bar-Ilan University, 1977; Arieh GLOBERSON, "The Joint 
Working Committee; A Preventative Approach to Labor Conflicts". Yachasei Avoda, Labor 
Relations, VII, November, 1977, pp. 12-14 (Abstract of paper presented at the annual conven-
tion of the Industrial Relations Research Association of Israël); Eliezer ROSENSTEIN, 
"Labor Relations in Israeli Shipping", Yachasei Avoda, Labor Relations, VIII, November, 
1977, pp. 26-27 (Abstract of paper presented at the annual convention of the Industrial Rela-
tions Research Association of Israël). (Ail the above in Hebrew). 
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This point needs further elucidation. The Chief Labor Relations Of-
ficer of the Labor Relations Division in Israel's Ministry of Labor 
recognizes eleven officiai "causes" of strikes2. 
They are: wages and fringe benefits; signing of labor agreements; 
demands for reclassification; demands for union récognition; hiring of 
workers; firing of workers; closure or transfer of enterprise; solidarity 
strike; physical conditions at work; lockout; unknown (miscellaneous). 
Thèse are immédiate causes of strikes, the matches that set off the ex-
plosives, but they do not tell us why thèse same causes do not precipitate in 
ail situations or why there are more strikes in one period, or one industry, 
than in another. The officiai causes of strikes, which to date hâve served as 
the bases for scholars' analyses,3 is only one starting point from which to 
draw conclusions of gênerai validity regarding the incidence of strikes. In-
sufficient pay may serve as a suitable partial explanation for what triggered 
an individual strike, but it does not provide a valid reason for ail the strikes 
filed under that category. Moreover, reliance upon such "causes" fails to 
explain why workers do not strike despite insufficient pay, while at other 
times they do strike despite adequately high wages. 
Consequently, this formai distinction between cause and reason seems 
in order hère if we wish to approach the question of strikes from a level 
generalized enough to allow us to draw some valid theoretical conclusions. 
We will differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for strikes. 
They are as follows:4 
I. Extrinsic conditions favorable for strikes. 
A. Societal conditions favorable for strikes -
Lack of channels for political expression. 
B . Economie conditions favorable for strikes. 
Rising expectations. 
Rapid inflation. 
2 "Report on Labor Relations in Israël and Activities of the Labor Relations Division 
of the Ministry of Labor in 1974", Yachasei Avoda, Labor Relations, VI, October, 1975, p. 30 
(In Hebrew). 
3 MICHAEL and BAR-EL, Strikes in Israël. 
4 For a further discussion of some of the issues raised hère, see: Albert A. BLUM, 
"Collective Bargaining - Ritual or Reality?", Harvard Business Review, November-December, 
1961, pp. 63-69 and Albert A. BLUM, "Strikes, Salaries and the Search for Solutions: An In-
terprétative Analysis of the Irish Industrial Relations System", British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. X, No. 1, March 1972, pp. 62-83. 
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11. Intrinsic reasons for strikes. 
A . Increasing democratization of unions. 
Démocratie structure of unions. 
Multiplication and segmentation of local unions. 
B . Mistakes and errors in judgment during bargaining -
Due to early and angry stages. 
C . Improper bargaining practices. 
Lack of collective bargaining. 
Comparability and pattern-making. 
Ideological commitment. 
Unsatisfactory labor législation. 
EXTRINSIC REASONS FOR STRIKES 
By extrinsic (societal) conditions which favor conflicts which eventual-
ly resuit in strikes we do not mean direct causes for any particular strike, 
rather we refer to the characteristics of society at a given period of time. 
They are valid for (and in the background of) ail strikes, regardless of other 
immédiate causes. Their absence or présence help détermine the number of 
strikes called. Thèse conditions may be both social and économie. 
Social Conditions Favorable for Strikes - Lack of Channels for Political Expression 
It is consistent with our view of the labor-relations subsystem as in-
teracting with the political one, that difficulty in expressing political discon-
tent may create conditions favorable for labor conflicts. L.A. Coser stated 
that the cause of a conflict is not necessarily due to the existing relations bet-
ween the parties of a subsystem, rather that the conflict may reflect tensions 
originating from other subsystems5. Foliowing in Coser's footsteps, R. 
Hermesh argues that in Israël strikes may fulfil the rôle of a safety valve6. 
Israël is a new society plagued by difficult social and économie pro-
blems throughout its short history, and held in siège for ail of its thirty-year 
existence by external pressures. In the light of this, its political stability is 
remarkable. The explanation for this is that it has been necessary to 
downplay political tensions in Israël as long as such a major problem as 
5 COSER, L.A., "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change", British Journal 
o/Sociology, VIII, September, 1957, pp. 197-207. 
6 CHERMESH, Ran, "Strikes as Safety-Valve Institutions", Relations Industrielles, 
Vol. 32, No. 4, 1977, pp. 586-602. 
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défense overshadows ail the others. In a study based on content analysis of 
Israeli newspaper editorials from 1960-1962, Hermesh found that changes 
in the level of tension outside the industrial relations subsystem were 
reflected in strike activity. Relative increase (decrease) in the level of social 
tension caused a corresponding increase (decrease) in strike activity. We do 
not wish to argue that social and political tensions are the chief, or even one 
of the most important, reasons for strikes. We do agrée, however, that in a 
society in which thèse tensions do not gain adéquate relief, they may con-
tribute to the création of conditions favorable for strikes. 
Economie Conditions Favorable for Strikes 
RISING EXPECTATIONS 
Economie conditions also seem to be related to strike activity. Scholars 
in various parts of the world hâve long been debating the question of possi-
ble connections between the économie cycle and strike activity. While some 
mention that this connection is a positive one, and base their contentions on 
empirical data which corroborate this claim on the basis of various indices 
of économie activity, others, with equally well-documented data, claim the 
existence of a négative connection7. 
A major study, which examined strike activity in Israël during the years 
1960-1970, reveals that the level of économie activity by itself is not an in-
dicator of strike activity8. The factor which does influence strike activity is 
the gênerai level of investment, and, above ail, the accélération rate of in-
vestments from year to year. The obvious implication of this study is that 
the level of strikes is not correlated directly to économie cycles, but rather to 
the rising expectations of investors as expressed in the accélération rate of 
their investments. The expectations expressed by investors create similar ris-
ing expectations for better économie conditions among workers, and thus 
an increased interest in becoming partners in expected future opportunities. 
Thus, the period of increased expectations as expressed by the accélération 
in the level of investments créâtes the fertile ground for an increased level of 
strike activity. 
7 REES, Albert, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations", in Industrial Con-
flict, éd. by Arthur C. Hauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross, New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1954, pp. 213-220. 
8 MICHAEL and BAR-EL, Strikes in Israël, pp. 192-197. 
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RAPID INFLATION 
The harmful effects of rapid inflation, which are felt in ail branches of 
économie life in Israël, also affect labor relations. Labor unions hâve tried 
to protect their members from thèse effects through the instrument of cost-
of-living adjustment (COL). The COL clause has been successful in pro-
viding some protection by reimbursing workers for part of the cost of infla-
tion, but it has not eliminated ail the damage. The major harm of inflation 
is the instability and uncertainty which it introduces in the labor market, 
and consequently, in the collective bargaining process. To illustrate with 
just one example from a multitude of cases, we will cite the case of the Inter-
nai Revenue Service employées9. In March 1976, after intense and prolong-
ed negotiations, the Government signed a two-year contract with the union. 
During the summer and fall of the same year other contracts in the public 
sector were also signed, ail of which exceeded the terms which were agreed 
upon with the 1RS employées, because of the rapid inflation rate (35% per 
year). Because of this situation, the 1RS employées demanded a reopening 
of their contract in October of the same year in order to adjust their wages 
to other contracts. When the Government refused to reopen the signed con-
tract the union went on strike. 
In a situation where the économie terms of référence are changing 
rapidly, labor unions are reluctant to conclude their own agreements as long 
as other negotiations are in process because they are afraid that other 
unions will obtain more favorable contracts. Moreover, they (and manage-
ment) find it difficult to estimate what a settlement, satisfactory to those 
they represent, would be over time10. 
INTRINSIC REASONS FOR STRIKES 
Clearly, the basis which underlies the entire web of union-management 
relations is the fundamentally conflicting interests of unions and manage-
ment. Whithin the scale of values of management, reducing production 
costs is a high priority, whereas the union's major concern lies with pro-
9 LIFSHITZ, Eitan, "Three Ministers Criticize the Treasury's Handling of the Labor 
Conflict with 1RS Employées", Ha'Aretz, September 19, 1976, p. 8; and Eitan LIFSHITZ, 
"Dragging Out Collective Bargaining with Employées", Ha'Aretz, September 19, 1976, p. 10. 
(In Hebrew). 
10 See BLUM, "Strikes, Salaries and the Search for Solutions: An Interprétative 
Analysis of the Irish Industrial Relations System", pp. 72-73, for a further discussion of thèse 
issues. 
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viding employment and increasing income for its employées. This can create 
conflict but we believe that this conflict, which expresses itself frequently in 
a wage dispute between management and union, is not in itself sufficient 
reason (albeit, a necessary cause) for strikes. Thèse reasons must be sought, 
therefore, in the process of collective bargaining itself and in the arising 
obstacles which obstruct the orderly settlement of the original wage dispute. 
Increasing democratization of unions 
DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE OF UNIONS 
The spirit of democratization which engulfed the trade union move-
ment during the period when Itzhad Ben-Aharon was the Secretary General 
of the Histadrut (1969-1973) had a definite influence on strike activity in 
Israël. The spirit of innovation, the beginning of major reforms in the 
représentation System in the Histadrut, and the open door policy that the 
Secretary General declared created a new mood in the labor movement. 
This new mood also created uncertainty for trade union officiais whereby 
their position and status was challenged by the tank-and-file and by more 
militant trade union activists. Under such conditions trade union officiais 
had to adhère to a more miliant posture in order to protect their positions as 
"loyal" trade union leaders. 
TABLE 1 
Comparison of Level and Intensity of Strike Activity in Israël 
During the Years 1966-1968 and 1970-1972 
Number of Strikes Number of Strikers Number of Work Days Lost 
Absolu te 3 Years Absolute 3 Year Absolute 3 Year 
Year Numbers A ver âge Numbers A ver âge Numbers Average 
1966 268 82,147 131,300 
1967 132 167 23,646 49,142 52,959 88,113 
1968 96 41,635 70,081 
1970 163 114,941 390,344 
1971 169 166 88,265 96,838 178,612 268,004 
1972 168 87,309 235,058 
Table 1 compares in gross terms the level of strike activity during three 
years of Ben-Aharon's leadership with a three year period prior to his 
assuming the Secretary General position. It can be observed from this table 
that, although the average number of strikes per year did not change, the in-
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tensity of thèse strikes as measured by the number of strikers participating 
and the number of man-days lost in the strikes, increased substantially. This 
change in the intensity of strikes could be attributed to the spirit of 
democratization introduced by Ben-Aharon11. 
MULTIPLICATION AND SEGMENTATION OF LOCAL UNIONS 
In their famous study of the local union, Sayles and Strauss asserted 
that democracy fosters the participation of the rank-and-file in the affairs 
of the union, and that "participation déclines proportionally as the size of 
the local increases."12 This argument has been used occasionally by groups 
of workers, strategically located in the organization, to support their pro-
gram to split a large local union into a few représentative units. The gênerai 
public often looks with favor on such segmentation as reflecting démocratie 
values. On the other hand, local union splintering may hâve nothing to do 
with democracy but may only reflect the désire on the part of powerful 
groups of employées to secure spécial advantages in the collective bargain-
ing by using their stratégie position in the organization. 
Local union segmentation does its greatest damage to industrial tran-
quility at the plant level. The establishment of several local représentative 
units in one plant créâtes the fertile grounds for compétition, intrigues and 
mistrust among the différent locals. Instead of representing the locale 
membership and bargaining with management about its spécifie needs and 
demands, each bargaining unit concentrâtes on the achievements of the 
others in order to demand the same for itself. This process créâtes a vicious 
circle which forces the parties sometimes to make secret agreements, further 
increasing the mistrust among them. 
The volatile conditions created by segmentation can be observed in 
Israël in the case of El-Al, the national airline, where nine separate local 
units exist. The ability of each separate unit to stop the opération of the 
company, and the need of the leadership of each local unit to prove its 
power and ability vis-a-vis the other local units has created fertile ground 
for innumerable strikes which crippled this organization13. 
Finally, it should be said that the process of segmentation does not 
necessarily lead to increased democratization at the local level. Instead the 
11 BEN-AHARON, Itzhak, The Courage to Change, Jérusalem, Jérusalem Académie 
Press, 1973. 
12 SAYLES, Léonard R., and George STRAUSS, The Local Union, New York, Har-
court, Brace & World, 1967, p. 153. 
13 Committee to Investigate Labor Relations in "El Al", Report, Tel Aviv, March 
1976. (In Hebrew). 
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opposite may be true as Robert Michels hypothesized in his study about par-
ties and trade unions: 
If we accept the hypothesis that a true democracy may exist with the par-
ty, the tendency to the subdivision of powers is unquestionably anti-
democratic while centralization is, on the other hand, the best way of giv-
ing incontestable validity to the will of the masses.14 
Mistakes and Errors in Judgment During Bargaining - Particularly in the Early and 
Angry Stages 
In the beginning stage of any new framework of human interaction, 
there are more likely to be difficulties caused by lack of familiarity. In the 
labor relations arena thèse difficulties can express themselves in différent 
forms. The first example of the occurrence of such problems is when the 
collective bargaining process is new to the parties (i.e. the first time that col-
lective bargaining is introduced in an organization). The clumsiness of the 
parties, their lack of knowledge of the "rules of the game", and of each 
other, may bring about a break in the communication process taking place 
at the collective bargaining table and lead to strikes. Moreover, this situa-
tion might occur when the participants themselves are new to the process of 
collective bargaining, although the process itself is not new to the organiza-
tion. 
In an exhaustive study of the collective bargaining process in Israël 
conducted by Galin and Tabb in 1969-1970, significant light was shed on 
this issue15. They found that the length of time that novice représentatives, 
be they of workers or management, hâve been in office influences the will-
ingness of thèse représentatives to change their original demands and posi-
tions. The explanation given is that new représentatives, because of lack of 
security at the beginning, are less flexible about changing their original 
stand. As tenure and expérience of représentatives increase, they are more 
secure in their position, and are able to be more flexible and conciliatory in 
their collective bargaining tactics. Thèse findings about novice représen-
tatives at the collective bargaining table and their "stiffness" explain in part 
the reason for the breakdown of negotiations in collective bargaining in ear-
ly and angry stages. 
14 MICHELS, Robert, Political Parties, New York, Dover Publications, 1959, p. 197. 
15 GALIN, Amira, and G. Yanai TABB, "Collective Bargaining - Theoretical Ap-
proaches and the Israeli System", unpublished study, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 
1974. (Mimeographed, in Hebrew). 
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Improper Bargaining Practices 
LACK OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Often, although collective bargaining appears to be taking place, the 
reality is that no real negotiations, no give-and-take is occurring, or at 
times, one of the parties basically rejects the process itself. Understanding 
this reason properly can help us define one of the main reasons for strikes in 
Israël, specifically those in the Histadrut's industries. 
The Histadrut, in addition to being an "ordinary" trade union, is also 
the second largest employer in Israël, the first being the Government. Func-
tionally, the Histadrut is divided into four departments: the Trade Union 
Department, Hevrat Ovdim - the governing body of the Histadrut's 
économie enterprises, the Social Security Department, and the Center for 
Culture and Education. Thèse departments function independently of each 
other although they share the same top executives: the Secretary General, 
the Executive Bureau, the Executive Committee, the Council and the con-
vention of the Histadrut. The workers employed in the différent plants and 
factories of Hevrat Ovdim are organized and conduct collective bargaining 
with the respective managements of thèse enterprises. The major feature, 
however, of labor relations in the Histadrut industries, is that de jure the 
gênerai membership of the Histadrut owns the enterprises. In order to em-
phasize the ideology behind worker ownership of the means of production, 
the constitution of Hevrat Ovdim has provided from its inception that, in 
case of conflict or disagreement over the terms of an agreement between the 
Trade Union Department and Hevrat Ovdim, the issue be brought to dif-
férent joint committees in the Histadrut. If the conflict still continues 
unresolved, it is to be brought to the executive bureau for solution. This 
procédure places a good deal of strain on the collective bargaining process 
and, in many instances, éliminâtes it completely. Furthermore, since 
workers and local union stewards view the Trade Union Department as 
synonymous with or protective of the interests of the Hevrat Ovdim enter-
prises, and not of the workers, they frequently refrain from soliciting the 
support of the Trade Union Department for their strikes. Indeed, we 
suspect that the reason for the rate of wildeat strikes being the highest in the 
Histadrut sector (see Table 2) is connected with the feeling of rank-and-file 
members and local union officiais that no real collective bargaining process 
is exercised in this sector. 
Moreover, when the Labor Party was in power in Israël, there was a 
close tie between the Histadrut leadership and that party. While the Party 
sought to keep inflation down, it created tremendous pressures on the 
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Histadrut trade union leaders to keep its wage demands down. The workers, 
however sympathetic to lowering the rate of inflation, wanted higher wages 
to pay for the goods they needed. They, therefore, at times, went out on 
wildcat strikes to push union leaders, both in the Histadrut and in the public 
sector (and to a lesser degree in the private sector where the ties between the 
Histadrut and the Party to curb inflation were less clear), to act more 
vigorously in securing higher wages for the union members. 
TABLE 2 
Trade Union Department Authorization of Strikes 
by Sector, 1960-1969 
(In Percent) 
Private 
Sector 
Histadrut 
Sector 
Public 
Sector 
Total Strikes 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Authorized Strikes 60.8 23.5 34.7 
Unauthorized Strikes 39.2 76.5 65.3 
Source: Abraham Michael and Refael Bar-El, Strikes in Israël, 1960-1969: A Quantitative 
Approach, Ramat-Gan, Bar-Ilan University, 1977, pp. 95. 
COMPARABILITY AND PATTERN-MAKING 
Comparability in wage demands is a major issue in labor relations in 
Israël, because of the pervasiveness of this practice throughout the country 
and its resulting impact on industrial peace. A report prepared by a blue-
ribbon commission, appointed by the Government and the Histadrut to in-
vestigate wages and supplementary pay in the public sector,16 shows that in 
1975 the wages of 248,530 employées out of 303,610 employées in the public 
sector were compared partially or totally to the wage scale of engineers. 
The extent of the practice of comparability has made collective 
bargaining in the public sector more rigid. This has been true in other sec-
tors of the economy, where comparability flourishes. Because the labor 
market is limited, and information about agreements spreads easily, the 
issue of comparability became central, affecting the entire labor relations 
subsystem. 
16 Commission to Investigate Wages in the Public Sector, Report of the Commission, 
Recommendations Regarding Spécial Allowances, Jérusalem, Government Printing Office, 
1976. (In Hebrew). 
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The issue of comparability is related to the concept of "distributive 
justice" as discussed by Adams17 and Homans18. The parties* perception of 
the exchange process is based on the comparison of the ratio of outcomes to 
inputs that one gets, to the ratio of outcomes to inputs that others get. 
Thus, the exchange process is équitable when: 
Perception of selfs outcomes Perception of other's outcomes 
Perception of self*s inputs Perception of other's inputs 
Since the bargaining process is a dynamic one, and the conditions for 
exchange which unions and managements make are dépendent to a large ex-
tent on the conditions prevailing in the environment in which they function, 
many conflicts may arise because of changes in the environment or because 
of rigidity in the parties* perception of the equity of the exchange process. 
In fact it is possible to suggest that it is the perception of equity that is im-
portant hère, for equity may in fact exist, but may not be perceived as ex-
isting. Thus, though the search for equity in the exchange process is natural 
and harmless as such, as soon as institutionalized rigidities (e.g. com-
parability by law or by national labor agreements) are introduced, the pro-
bability for conflicts increases. 
An example of the harmful effects of comparability and its impact on 
conflicts took place in the health care sector during 1976-7719. Because of 
spécial conditions in this sector and the spécial désire of the Government to 
attract more nurses back to work in the profession (conditions in the en-
vironment), the Government decided in 1976 to grant nurses spécial 
monetary benefits. As soon as this policy was implemented, a flurry of 
strikes erupted in the health care sector. The main demand of the doctors 
and the auxiliary personnel was the restoration of the status quo ante of 
comparability of wages with the nurses. 
Besides the rigidities which institutionalized comparability introduces, 
making adaptation to the changing environment difficult, it also causes 
bargaining to degenerate from a process of exchange of inputs and outputs 
to a préoccupation with other issues. Instead of the parties concentrating on 
the issues of their own inputs and outcomes, they argue about the right 
group with which to be compared, thus making the exchange process 
cumbersome and increasing the potential for conflict. 
17 ADAMS, J.S., "Inequity in Social Exchange", in Advances in Expérimental Social 
Psychology, 2, éd. by L. Berkowitz, New York, Académie Press, 1965, pp. 267-300. 
18 HOMANS, G., Social Behavior, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961. 
19 DANKNER, Amnon, "Doctors Resign Today", Ha'Aretz, November 1, 1976, p. 1; 
and Editorial, "The Balance in the Nurses' Strike", Ha'Aretz, September 9, 1976, p. 9. (In 
Hebrew). 
110 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 1 (1980) 
Ideological Commitment 
One of the most common sources of conflict in any social System, and 
in particular in the labor relations System, is for a party to assume an emo-
tional or ideological commitment to some policy or issue and wage a "holy 
war" to fight for its préservation. We include this reason under the broader 
category of bargaining practices which resuit in strikes because of the nature 
of a "holy war". The party fighting for an issue or policy which it has 
declared "holy" finds it difficult to renounce or forego any part of it. In 
labor relations terms, the situation becomes particularly servere when 
established practices of bargaining are changed or when certain issues which 
were previously bargainable are, at a certain point in time, deliberately ex-
cluded from the bargaining process by being declared "holy" by one of the 
parties. 
A striking example of the impact of such an ideological commitment 
on the level of labor conflicts occurred during the 1963-1965 period in 
Israël. A major effort was made by the Israeli Government during this 
period to introduce a wage policy in the public sector which was based on 
scientific job évaluation and whose raison d'être was equal pay for work of 
equal value20. This new wage policy was supposed to bring ail public 
employées under the umbrella of one wage scale and establish new criteria 
for wage differentiation among the différent professions in the public sec-
tor. The Government's insistence on the universal implementation of the 
new wage policy and its underlying philosophy was unrelenting, and thus, 
no elbow room was left for the Government to bargain for exceptions to the 
rule with any group of workers. Under thèse new circumstances, when dif-
férent groups of workers sensed the impossibility of changing the Govern-
ment's commitment through bargaining, they chose the strike as the means 
of achieving their goals. The beginning of the end of the new wage policy 
came with a strike by the engineers' union which was not willing to accept 
the Government's "holy war" position on a single wage scale. The strike ac-
tivity related to the new wage policy widened and spread throughoul: the en-
tire public sector until the Government relinquished its firm commitment. 
Unsatisfactory Labor Législation 
Most scholars of industrial relations pay spécial attention to législation 
and its administration in the labor relations subsystem. Dunlop defines this 
20 HAREL, Gedaliahu, "Job Evaluation and Wage Setting in the Public Sector of 
Israël", Relations Industrielles, VII/2, 1976, pp. 184-302. 
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function as one of the main outputs of the subsystem,21 and Mabry explains 
this function in the folio wing terms: "Législation and its administration 
represent an attempt to balance opposing forces and interests and to résolve 
conflicts by more clearly defining the legitimate areas of activity of the par-
ties with conflicting interests."22 
Deficiencies in labor législation could be and are a source of friction 
and conflicts between the parties of the labor relations subsystem. In Israël, 
labor législation involves an extensive code of laws adopted mostly after 
1948. In addition, earlier laws adopted during the British Mandate in 
Palestine and even under the Turkish Empire are still in use. One of its most 
obvious and disturbing deficiencies is that there are no laws governing the 
establishment, functions, responsibilities and liabilities of labor unions and 
of employers' associations. The unsatisfactory arrangement under which 
unions and employers function is an old Turkish law dating back to 1909 
and which was intended mainly for voluntary non-profit organizations. 
Although various labor laws spell out some duties and functions of labor 
unions, this is not sufficient insofar as it leaves most issues regarding the 
functions of thèse organizations inadequately covered by unified législa-
tion. 
Zamir, a leading labor law scholar, discusses in a comprehensive study 
the extent and implications of thèse deficiencies in labor législation23. We do 
not mean to reassess the problem, but rather to illustrate by means of an ex-
ample the way in which the deficiency in labor législation may generate con-
flicts in the labor relations subsystem. 
The Labor Disputes Seulement Law of 1957 states that the parties to a 
labor conflict are the employer on the one side and the workers' organiza-
tion which represents the majority of workers involved in the dispute (and if 
such an organization does not exist, then the représentatives elected by the 
majority of the workers for any purpose or for the spécifie conflict) on the 
other. The obvious question that suggests itself in this context is whether a 
wildeat strike (a strike declared by a local union without prior authorization 
from the national or régional trade union), a slowdown opération or any 
other partial strikes are légal strikes or not. Thus far, no satisfactory légal 
21 DUNLOP, John T., Industrial Relations Systems, Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1958, p. 13. 
22 M A B R Y , B . D . , Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining, New York : T h e R o n a l d 
Press , 1966, p . 14. 
23 ZAMIR, Itzhak, "Workers Organizations and Employers - The Législative Arrange-
ment", in Labor Research in Israël, éd. by Rivka Bar-Yosef and Eliezer Leshem, Jérusalem: 
Institute for Research on Labor and Welfare, Hebrew University, 1974, pp. 31-50. (In 
Hebrew). 
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answer can be given to this question on the basis of existing législation. 
Since the majority of strikes in the past few years in Israël were unauthoriz-
ed strikes, and since this phenomenon continues to spread, we are faced 
with a situation in which, although a law concerning the parties to a labor 
conflict is in effect, it does not cover the majority of such actual conflicts. 
This situation is furthur aggravated by the fact that there are no clear légal 
définitions regarding the rights and duties of the local labor unions. It is 
possible that many of the wildcat strikes could hâve been avoided or stop-
ped if appropriate législative tools had been provided to the labor relations 
subsystem. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we do not believe that strikes are neither destructive to 
labor relations, nor an indicator of the health of an industrial relations 
System. If, however, we wish to limit the number of strikes, we must 
recognize the reasons for the strikes and act upon them, rather than try to 
treat symptoms, as has been the case in Israël so far. 
Thus, while 50% of the strikes are officially registered in the Israeli 
Labor Relations Division as being caused by "insufficient pay", it is naive 
to think that ail thèse strikes could hâve originated in an obstinate refusai of 
management to meet the demands of the union or as an adamant désire of 
the union to drain the company. It is true that money was the immédiate 
cause of the breakdown, but this should not lead us to the erroneous conclu-
sion that it explains completely why the strike, in fact, took place. It is 
mistaken to imagine that a disagreement over money will lead inexorably to 
an interruption of contact between the parties. To prevent such interruption 
means not only dealing with, for example, wages, but also with the more 
basic reasons we hâve described. 
Les causes génériques des grèves: 
une interprétation du cas israélien 
À cause de leur effet néfaste sur l'économie en Israël, les grèves sont devenues 
sujets d'enquêtes scientifiques de la part des spécialistes en relations professionnelles 
dans ce pays. Plusieurs études ont été publiées, mais elles paraissent déficientes dans 
leurs conclusions en ce qu'elles ne parviennent pas à découvrir les causes profondes 
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qui les engendrent. Celles-ci, en effet, ne doivent pas être confondues avec les occa-
sions immédiates des grèves prises individuellement. 
Une distinction s'impose. Si les occasions de grèves peuvent résulter de 
différends entre les parties tels les désaccords en matière de salaires et d'avantages 
sociaux, l'embauchage ou le congédiement des salariés, la reconnaissance des syn-
dicats, la fermeture des entreprises, etc., les causes véritables ont un caractère plus 
profond et elles peuvent être extrinsèques ou intrinsèques. 
Parmi les causes extrinsèques, on peut citer les conditions de la vie sociale, com-
me le manque de canaux d'expression politique, les conditions d'ordre économique 
comme l'inflation galopante. Il s'agit de situations favorisant les conflits qui 
dégénèrent ensuite en grève, et d'un état général de la société considérée à une 
période donnée qui s'applique à toutes les grèves et qui aide à en déterminer le nom-
bre. 
En Israël, on a trouvé, par exemple, que le facteur qui avait exercé le plus d'in-
fluence sur le nombre des grèves n'était pas le niveau de l'activité économique, mais 
le taux, surtout le taux d'accélération, des investissements. Les espoirs exprimés par 
les investisseurs créent des espoirs similaires parmi les salariés désireux d'obtenir leur 
part du gâteau, ce qui constitue un climat général favorable aux grèves. De même, les 
effets funestes d'une inflation rapide, qui affectent toutes les branches de la vie 
économique ont aussi un effet négatif sur les relations professionnelles, parce que les 
syndicats doivent s'efforcer de protéger leurs membres par des clauses d'indexation. 
D'autre part, il faut aussi considérer les causes intrinsèques des grèves. 
Celles-ci résultent d'abord en Israël de la démocratisation des syndicats, soit par 
la mise en place de structures qui permettent à la base de jouer un rôle plus important 
dans la prise des décisions, soit par la multiplication et la fragmentation des sections 
locales. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que l'établissement de plusieurs unités de représen-
tation dans une entreprise favorise la concurrence, les intrigues et la méfiance entre 
les diverses sections. Au lieu de faire valoir ses besoins et ses revendications spécifi-
ques, chaque unité de négociation concentre son attention sur les gains des autres 
pour en obtenir d'identiques ou d'analogues, ce qui crée un cercle vicieux forçant 
quelquefois les parties à conclure des accords secrets. 
Autre cause intrinsèque des grèves: les erreurs de jugement provenant des 
maladresses des parties, du défaut de connaissances des règles du jeu ou du fait que 
des négociateurs inexpérimentés manquent de flexibilité au cours des tractations. 
On peut aussi ranger parmi les causes intrinsèques des grèves les pratiques de 
négociations incorrectes. Il arrive fréquemment que les négociations ne sont qu'ap-
parentes. Au fond, il ne se passe rien dans la réalité, chaque partie demeurant cram-
ponnée à ses exigences. En certains cas, on va jusqu'à rejeter le mécanisme de 
négociation lui-même. On abuse aussi du recours aux comparaisons: cette tendance a 
rendu la négociation collective plus rigide, principalement dans le secteur public, 
mais on la retrouve aussi dans le secteur privé. Au lieu de concentrer leur attention 
sur les enjeux de la négociation, les parties discutent des groupes auxquels elles esti-
ment devoir être comparées, ce qui rend lourd le processus des négociations et 
augmente d'autant les possibilités de conflit. 
Par ailleurs, une des sources majeures d'opposition dans tout système social 
porte sur les questions d'idéologie. Chacun veut faire sa «guerre sainte». En matière 
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de relations professionnelles, la situation devient particulièrement grave quand les 
mécanismes de négociation bien établis sont modifiés ou quand certaines questions, 
jusque là négociables, sont délibérément exclues par l'une ou l'autre des parties. 
Enfin, beaucoup de spécialistes accordent une grande importance à la législation 
dont les déficiences peuvent être et sont effectivement une source de conflits entre les 
parties. En Israël, l'une d'entre elles est qu'il n'existe à peu près pas de lois touchant 
l'établissement, les fonctions, les responsabilités et les obligations des syndicats et 
des associations d'employeurs. 
Que conclure si ce n'est que les grèves ne sont pas un indicateur de l'état de santé 
d'un système de relations professionnelles mais que, si l'on veut limiter le nombre de 
grèves, il faut en connaître les causes véritables plutôt que d'en traiter les 
symptômes? En Israël, on catalogue cinquante pour cent des grèves sous la rubrique 
«salaire insuffisant». Il est naïf de penser que toutes ces grèves ont leur origine dans 
le refus des employeurs de satisfaire aux exigences du syndicat ou le désir du syndicat 
d'écraser l'employeur. Il est vrai que les questions d'argent furent souvent l'occasion 
immédiate de la grève, mais cela ne doit pas conduire à la conclusion énoncée que 
celles-ci expliquent totalement le fait de la grève. C'est une méprise d'imaginer qu'un 
désaccord sur des problèmes d'argent peut inexorablement entraîner une interrup-
tion des contacts entre les parties. Pour empêcher de pareilles interruptions, il faut 
non seulement se préoccuper des salaires, mais aussi des causes plus profondes des 
arrêts de travail. 
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